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Question: What can owners do if a CMS change was registered without the required motion without dissent?

Our committee presented a motion at an AGM to change the positions of three exclusive use car parks. The motion required a motion without dissent, and it failed. At the following AGM, the committee presented another motion to change the positions of the same three exclusive use car parks, but this time as an ordinary motion to change the
community management statement (CMS). The ordinary motion passed, and the new CMS was lodged and registered.
A motion without dissent to authorise the change has never been passed. What happens if a CMS is lodged and registered without the required authority?

Answer: Transposing exclusive use car parks is easy. Moving the location of exclusive use car parks is much harder.

Transposing exclusive use car parks is easy. Moving the location of exclusive use car parks is much harder.

Transposition of car parks occurs when, for example, lot owners (LO) decide they would like to “swap” car parks to better suit their respective needs. Under such an arrangement (called an “agreed allocation” under the Body
Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Act)), the location of the exclusive use car parks does not change; rather it is the lot to which the exclusive use car park “attaches” which changes.

Where LOs agree to reallocate car parks, they must request that their body corporate (BC) record a new CMS to reflect the car park swap. Typically, this request is made after the relevant LOs have entered into a written reallocation arrangement.

Once the LOs notify the BC of the agreed allocation, the BC must record a new CMS to show all the (exclusive use) allocations currently in place (including the new allocation). The BC has only three months to do this after the agreed allocation between the relevant LOs takes effect. If the BC fails to record that new CMS, the agreed allocation ceases to have effect.

That said, an application can be made, typically by the relevant LOs, seeking an adjudicator to extend the time the BC has to record the new CMS reflecting the agreed allocation. That application may take place during or after the initial 3-month period. If an adjudicator makes such an order, the time limit is extended, and the agreed allocation is taken to have always been in effect, after it was first made.

There is some debate as to whether there must be a “swap” as opposed to, for example, one LO reallocating one of their two exclusive use car parks to another LO who has none. Putting aside considerations relating to the development approval for the scheme (which may well mandate how the car parks are distributed), it is
most likely that what is required is:

1. each LO who wishes to participate in a reallocation must already have exclusive use of some type; and

2. at least one exclusive use area is reallocated from one LO to another.

This reasoning flows from the definition of “reallocation agreement” in the Act, which is the mechanism by which LOs make an agreed allocation. Particularly, the Act defines a “reallocation agreement” as “an agreement in writing under which two or more owners of lots for which allocations are in place under an exclusive use by-law agree to redistribute the allocations between the lots“.

The other option regarding this scenario is that the committee is purporting to “move” the exclusive use areas.

Technically, to “move” an exclusive use area, the existing grant of exclusive use has to be cancelled, and a new exclusive use grant must be made. That is assuming that the original owners’ (developers’) power to make authorised allocations of exclusive use areas has expired and the existing exclusive use by-laws do not contain a “self-determination” provision.

Both for the purposes of cancelling a grant of exclusive use and making a fresh grant, the LOs directly affected must either agree in writing to the cancellation and grant before the relevant votes take place, or they must vote personally on each of the motions. Each of the motions must pass by resolution without dissent.

Occasionally, adjudicators are called upon to examine what appears to be the “moving” of an exclusive use area, when what has actually occurred is that a more accurate sketch plan of the exclusive use area has been prepared and recorded with a new CMS.

Since the Act came into effect in 1997, there have been significant changes to the Registrar of Title’s requirements regarding sketch plans of exclusive use areas. In some cases, exclusive use areas appear to “move” because they were not accurately located when originally described in the earlier version of the sketch plan. As a result, under a new and compliant sketch plan, the area and location of boundaries of an exclusive use area may appear to change.

If there is a fight about the boundaries ‘moving’, Adjudicators will usually recognise newer, more accurate sketch plans as simply better describing the exclusive use areas, rather than “moving” the boundaries of those areas.

This article by Queensland Partner Michael Kleinschmidt first appeared in April 2026 edition of The QLD Strata Magazine from LookUpStrata Pty Ltd.

 humans only; no AI was used to create this content

© Bugden Allen Group Legal Pty Ltd. This is general information only and not legal advice. You should not rely on this information without seeking legal advice tailored to your specific circumstances.

The overwhelming majority of relationships between committees and their body corporate’s caretaker are professional, functional, and conducted in the best interests of lot owners.

Occasionally, issues arise – even to the extent that they can seem irresolvable. Many times, over the last quarter century, I have seen caretakers and committees put ‘their side of the story’ to the lot owners, to try to control the narrative.

The rules of that game changed a couple of years ago when the code of conduct for body corporate managers and caretaking service contractors, in Schedule 2 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Act) was amended.

Item 2, ‘Honesty, Fairness, and Professionalism’, now includes that a caretaking service contractor (management rights operator) must not unfairly influence or attempt to unfairly influence the outcome of a motion to be decided by the Body Corporate.

That restriction was aimed at caretakers seeking to influence the outcome of motions crucial to the operation of their business and the preservation of the value of their management rights asset; for example, motions to extend or ‘top up’ the agreement term, increase the remuneration, or change the duties.

It is important to note that the code of conduct in Schedule 1 for voting committee members did not change in the same way.

While there are other positive duties on committee voting members, there is a double standard when it comes to seeking to influence the outcome of a motion to be decided by a body corporate.

A body corporate is not a natural person. It can only ‘do’ things through its officers, which means, in almost all cases, the body corporate committee (and, in some cases, particular committee members).

In Queensland, it has been a long standing legal ‘norm’ that committees could do nothing unless they first made a formal decision to do it (i.e., passed a committee resolution within a committee meeting or by vote outside committee). Being such a basic proposition, there has not been any significant challenge to it over the years.

The principle makes sense, and provides protection to the committee members themselves, lot owners, and third parties. For example, unless or until the committee voted on a particular proposition (e.g., whether to send a letter expressing particular views on behalf of the committee), each committee member was not only entitled to hold their particular views, but to express them as a lot owner, free from any obligation to ‘tow the committee line’.

The most important advantage of the ‘there must be a vote on anything the committee decides’ proposition was that the committee could then be held to account. That is, by any person entitled to challenge the committee’s decision. For example, a committee deciding whether to approve a lot owner’s request to install an air-conditioner could be the subject of a dispute resolution application under Chapter 6 of the BCCM Act by the unsuccessful applicant.

In the recent decision of The Village Chancellor Park [2026] QBCCMCmr87 (20 March 2026), an adjudicator has determined that committees can make decisions, on some issues, without following the formal committee decision making processes in the Act.

In particular, the committee in question did not need to make a formal decision to decide to send a letter to all lot owners, expressing views about what the caretaking agreement required, that the caretaker’s performance was poor, and inviting owners to communicate with the committee about the caretaker’s performance.

The Adjudicator’s reasoning effectively created two ‘levels’ of body corporate (and committee) decision making.

The first level is where the body corporate has a source of power in the Act or elsewhere, and when exercising that power, the body corporate has to comply with the requirements for exercising that power. For example, when deciding whether to terminate a caretaking agreement, the lot owners must vote on the issue at a general meeting.

In the Adjudicator’s view, a source of power will be required when the body corporate makes a decision that affects the rights, interest or obligations of the body corporate, owners, occupiers or other parties entitled to have their interests accounted for. While not stated, the implied corollary, was that absent such a source of power, these sorts of ‘first level’ decisions could not be made.

The (new) second level decisions were those that do not affect the rights, interests or obligations of the body corporate, owners, occupiers or other parties entitled to have their interests accounted for. According to the Adjudicator, no formal source of power is required for these decisions, and thus the formal requirements in the Act (about decision making generally) do not need to be adhered to.

Having found that the committee’s ‘election’ to send the letter to lot owners fell into the second category of decision, no formal committee resolution was required to adopt the letter, and to decide to send it.

In the view of the Adjudicator, the caretaker’s objections to the committee doing so were (in effect) technical, the caretaker’s goal in the dispute was to make sure the owners knew the caretaker disagreed with the committee’s views, and as that had been done, no relief should be granted. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

Aside from upsetting a bedrock understanding about how committees make decisions in Queensland, the decision gives rise to some very serious consequences, if followed.

First, the process of determining what a second level decision is, and the debate and disputes around that, will be a lawyer’s feast.

Second, any ‘second level’ decision is not reviewable under the Act, because, as the body corporate relying on the decision will argue, Chapter 6 of the Act is not available to a would be challenger, on the basis that there is no formal decision to review, there must be a decision of the relevant decision maker before there is a justiciable dispute (K.G. Tully & Anor. v. The Proprietors The Nelson Body Corporate [2000] QDC 31 (10 March 2000)) and there can be no ‘dispute’ anyway, because the second level decision is not about the ‘exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under the Act or the community management statement’ (per section 228(1(b) of the Act).

Third, it’s easy to see how ‘second level’ decision making can be abused. What’s to stop a committee deciding to send a letter to all lot owners expressing the committee’s views about (for example) what they say the by-laws require, how Bob in unit 4 is not complying with the by-laws, that the committee thinks Bob should shape up or move out, and to contact the committee if other lot owners don’t like Bob either.

If The Village Chancellor Park is followed, then bodies corporate, and in particular committees, will be less accountable to everyone, and not just their current caretaker.

Committees are the engine room of community title in Queensland, powering bodies corporate to get things done. Countless, usually thankless, hours are volunteered by committee members. All that having been said, committees must be accountable for their decisions, especially when they cause controversy, and especially when they impact lives and livelihoods.

This article written by QLD Partner Michael Kleinschmidt was first published on Bugden Allen website on 2 April 2026.

 humans only; no AI was used to create this content

© Bugden Allen Group Legal Pty Ltd. This is general information only and not legal advice. You should not rely on this information without seeking legal advice tailored to your specific circumstances.

In the April 2026 edition of STRATA INSITE we cover:

FEATURED ARTICLES:

  • NSW Strata Commissions Review: What the Productivity Commission’s Final Report Means for the Industry

UPDATES AND ARTICLES FROM OUR TEAM

  • NSW: NSW Strata regulatory updates: 5 Key Changes
  • NSW: New training requirement for strata committees
  • NSW: NSW Strata Information Certificates: Key Changes from 1 April 2026
  • NSW: NSW capital works fund plans and initial maintenance schedule changes: 1 April 2026
  • NSW: NSW Cooling-Off Notice Update
  • QLD Article: Conduct of general meetings in Queensland – dealing with business outside of the meeting agenda
  • QLD: Home Warranty Insurance and community titles schemes
  • QLD: Administrator’s Costs – How to Make the Responsible Party Pay
  • QLD: The Legend of Atlantis – Management Rights Agreements can only be topped up once.
  • QLD: Engaging a Contractor in Queensland: what to check before you sign
  • QLD: Meet Queensland’s new planning authority for apartments… your neighbours.
  • QLD: New Online Resources from the Commissioner’s Office
  • VIC Article: Latent Defect Insurance: A Longer-Term Safety Net
  • VIC Article: The Developer Bond Scheme: A New Safety Net for Apartment Buyers
  • VIC: When VCAT Isn’t an Option: The Interstate Respondent Problem
  • WA: Recovery of costs in SAT proceedings – hourly rates for self-represented parties?
  • WA: Conflicts of interest – council members of strata companies in Western Australia

Q&A’s

  • How can we stop our caretaker from restricting our short term guests’ accessing common facilities?

If you have a question that you would like answered, please submit it to info@bagl.com.au.

A huge thank you to all the Bugden Allen team for providing such an insightful and comprehensive newsletter 🙂

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What if I told you that a single clause in your strata contract, one you’ve relied on for years, could now be void?

From 1 July 2025, unfair contract terms in NSW strata agreements are no longer just bad practice, they’re unlawful.

For the first time, owners corporations and community associations will be explicitly protected by the unfair contract terms provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) when entering into certain standard form contracts, such as:

  • strata management agreements
  • building and facilities management contracts
  • cleaning, gardening, and other service arrangements
  • the sale or grant of an interest in land

That means any one-sided clauses that tip the balance unfairly will not only be unenforceable but could also attract significant penalties.

Why Now?

The reforms were introduced through the Strata Schemes Legislation Amendment Act 2025 following recommendations from the 2021 review of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW).

This particular change is effected by an amendment to the Fair Trading Act 1987. Under the new section 32A, the unfair contract terms provisions apply to contracts entered into by owners corporations and community associations.

For years, individuals and small businesses have had protection against unfair terms in standard contracts. Owners corporations, despite entering major long-term contracts, fell through the cracks, as the unfair contract terms provisions have only been applicable to “consumer contracts” and “small business contracts”, neither of which cover contracts involving an owners corporation. These changes close that gap and bring much-needed fairness and accountability to strata dealings.

What Counts as “Unfair”?

Under section 24 of the ACL, a term is unfair if it:

  1. creates a significant imbalance in rights and obligations;
  2. isn’t reasonably necessary to protect the other party’s legitimate interests; and
  3. causes (or could cause) financial or other detriment if relied upon.

Importantly, even the potential for harm is enough.

Here are some real-world examples that may no longer survive scrutiny:

  • One-sided exits: A strata manager can terminate at any time without penalty, but the owners corporation must give three months’ notice and pay fees.
  • Heavy termination penalties: Owners corporations face large exit fees, while poor performance by the contractor has no consequences.
  • No accountability: Building managers disclaim responsibility for subcontractors they’ve hired.
  • Assignment without consent: The manager transfers the contract to another company without informing the owners corporation.

What Happens If a Term Is Unfair?

If a court or tribunal finds a clause unfair, it’s void.as if it was never there. The rest of the contract may still stand, but parties relying on unfair terms risk:

  • having contracts varied or struck out;
  • injunctions, damages, or compensation orders; and/or
  • for the first time, serious financial penalties.

Why This Matters Beyond NSW

While the changes apply only in NSW, their ripple effects could be national.

Victoria has already given VCAT power to rule on fairness of strata contract terms, and other jurisdictions may follow NSW’s lead. For contractors and managers operating across states, the practical response will likely be to standardise contracts in line with NSW’s new rules.

So, even if you’re outside NSW, the question is worth asking: are our contracts fair enough to withstand scrutiny if these laws arrive here?

Key takeaway: From 1 July 2025, strata contracts in NSW must meet the same fairness standards as consumer contracts. Now is the time for owners corporations to review agreements, and for service providers to get ahead of the change.

If you are an owner or a stakeholder in an NSW strata scheme, there have been significant changes in the legislation that may affect your strata living. For more information on the changes brought by Strata Schemes Legislation Amendment Act 2025, visit this article on our website: Strata Schemes Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (NSW) commences in 2025 to introduce further strata reform (https://bagl.com.au/strata-schemes-legislation-amendment-act-2025/)

—END—

This article was first published on 26 August 2025. It was written by Julia Moroz, Special Counsel in Melbourne, Coco Chen, Solicitor in NSW.

© Bugden Allen Group Legal Pty Ltd. This is general information only and not legal advice. You should not rely on this information without seeking legal advice tailored to your specific circumstances.

It’s an easy mistake to make.

You have what looks like a straightforward claim. It fits within VCAT’s usual jurisdiction, so you prepare and file your application. Only afterwards do you realise the respondent is based outside Victoria.

At that point, the real issue is no longer the strength of your claim. It is whether VCAT can hear it at all.

The Constitutional Catch

Where a dispute is between residents of different States, it falls within federal jurisdiction under section 75(iv) of the Constitution. That matters because only courts that meet the requirements of Chapter III can exercise that jurisdiction.

VCAT is not one of them.

That position was confirmed in Burns v Corbett (2018) 265 CLR 304; 353 ALR 386; 92 ALJR 423; [2018] HCA 15. The High Court made it clear that State tribunals cannot determine matters that fall within federal jurisdiction.

The effect is subtle but significant. A claim that would ordinarily proceed in VCAT may become constitutionally incapable of being heard there, simply because one party is interstate.

Why VCAT Cannot Hear These Matters

The answer lies in institutional independence.

Courts exercising federal judicial power must meet strict constitutional standards. Those standards include security of tenure and independence from the executive.

VCAT does not meet that threshold. Its members are appointed for fixed terms and may be reappointed, creating a structure that does not provide the level of independence required of a Chapter III court.

This was reinforced in Meringnage v Interstate Enterprises Pty Ltd (2020) 386 ALR 588, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that VCAT is not a “Court of a State”.

Earlier authority, including Director of Housing v Sudi, also emphasises the limits of VCAT’s role. As an administrative tribunal, it has no inherent jurisdiction and cannot exercise powers reserved to courts, including broader forms of judicial review or collateral challenge.

Taken together, these decisions draw a clear boundary around what VCAT can and cannot do.

The Practical Consequence

The practical outcome is often unexpected.

A dispute that would ordinarily be brought in VCAT, whether a building claim, consumer dispute or residential matter, may fall outside its jurisdiction simply because one party is located interstate.

The claim itself remains intact. But the forum disappears.

Where the Matter Goes Instead

To address this gap, legislative amendments introduced a pathway to the Magistrates’ Court.

Where a matter would otherwise have been brought in VCAT but involves federal subject matter, it can instead be commenced in the Magistrates’ Court. That court has the constitutional status required to determine the dispute.

Why It Matters

The lesson is a practical one.

Jurisdiction is not just about the nature of the dispute. It also turns on who the parties are.

Before commencing proceedings, it is worth checking whether any party is based outside Victoria. If so, what appears to be a routine VCAT matter may need to start somewhere entirely different.

This article was first published on March 31, 2026 and was written by Julia Moroz, Partner and Brodie Dyer, Solicitor in our Melbourne office.

© Bugden Allen Group Legal Pty Ltd. This is general information only and not legal advice. You should not rely on this information without seeking legal advice tailored to your specific circumstances.